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William Ricquier*

The University Visitor'

Despite having provided, in Doctor Bentley's case, 2 one of the
seminal cases concerning the right to be heard, it would be an
exaggeration to say that the university as an institution has played a
major role in the emergence of a developed system of administrative
law. There are a number of reasons for this. Generally, it must be
observed that only in comparatively recent times has there been
such a system, and that, either as a part of such a development, or as
a result of it, the courts have only recently extended the scope of
judicial review from such traditional, and obvious, areas of
administrative power as government departments, local authorities
and licensing tribunals, into the less clearly 'public' field of trade
unions, clubs and universities.
Secondly, there has been far less need for judicial intervention
into the disciplinary affairs of universities in the United Kingdom
and the Commonwealth than, for example, in the United States.
There, emotive issues such as McCarthyism, and the conflict in
southeast Asia, the existence of the declared constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection, and the sheer size of the modem
American university, with all the strains inherent therein, have
combined to produce a torrent of litigation.
More particularly, the courts have historically been reluctant to
intervene in the internal matters of a university, especially where
provision has been made for the existence of a 'visitor', a peculiar
and exclusive 'justiciary' established by the founder of an institution
to give effect to its private laws. Even in the United States, where
there is no equivalent to the visitor, the courts frequently express
their reluctance to intervene, particularly in academic matters. The
existence of a visitor is also connected with the question of the
extent to which a university is a 'public' institution.
*Faculty of Law, University of Liverpool. This article is based upon a thesis
written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws at
Dalhousie University.
1. See Bridge, "Keeping Peace in the Universities" (1970), 86 L.Q.R. 531
(hereinafter Bridge); Ouellette, "Le Controle Judiciaire sur 'Universite' (1970),
48 Can. B. Rev. 631; Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.) Vol. 5, paras.
872-879.
2. R. v. Chancellor of Cambridge University (1723), 1 Str. 537, 93 E.R. 698; 2
Lord Raym, 1334; 92 E.R. 370; and 8 Mod. Rep. 148; 88 E.R. 11 (K.B.)
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The institution of the Visitor is an ancient one - one writer has
dismissed it as being "redolent of monarchical paternalism for an
isolated, unworldly community of scholars.'' 3 However there are
good grounds for arguing that this view, which has also been
expressed in the courts, 4 is simply an example of the tendency to
identify age with anachronism. It is probably an exaggeration to say
that the Visitor is the answer to "the crisis in the universities".
Nonetheless the Visitor, being situated, theoretically, at the head of
the university hierarchy, is at the same time not, strictly speaking, a
member of the university: consequently he should be able to
maintain a detached, but at the same time knowledgable view of
university affairs. By the full exercise of his functions he helps to
preserve the autonomy of the university by shielding its internal
disputes from the supervision of the courts. This aspect of the
visitor's role, his exclusive jurisdiction in internal matters, was
strongly emphasised in the course of the most recent case on the
matter, Vanek v. Governors of University of Alberta, 5 where the
application of an associate professor to have the proceedings of a
committee established under university regulations in order to
consider whether he should be granted tenure set aside on the
grounds, inter alia, of a breach of natural justice, was dismissed.
The decisions both at first instance and on appeal were based
substantially on the premise that the granting of tenure, whatever
the degree of susceptibility to an attack on the grounds of breach of
natural justice, was in any case an internal matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor, and thus not a subject for the
courts determination at all.
Any general review of the role of the visitor must perforce have
reference to a number of old, English cases, which may, as far as
the casual reader is concerned, bear little relation to the situation in
modem Canadian or indeed British universities. Criticisms on this
score can be answered in a number of ways. Firstly, there is the
undeniable fact that there is a mass of ancient caselaw which it
would obviously be fatuous to ignore altogether. This fact is closely
related to two others. Firstly, the most that modem university,
3. Samuels, "The Student and the Law" (1973), 12 Journal of the Society of
Public Teachers of Law, 252 at 260.
4. See, e.g. R. v. Royal Institutionfor the Advancement of Learning, ex parte
Fekete (1969), 2 D.L.R. 3d 124 (Que. Q.B.) at 138,per Brossard J.
5. Vanek v. Governor of University of Alberta, [1975] 3 W.W.R. 167 (Alta.
S.C.T.D.); affirmed [1975] 5 W.W.R. 429 (Alta. S.C., A.D.)
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statutes seem to be able to say about the visitors whom they,
doubtless unwittingly bring into existence, is that they shall have
power 'to do all such things as pertain to visitors.' 6 Clues as to what
those powers might be, are not surprisingly, most likely to be found
in old cases. Finally, although the modem university is in some
respects barely comparable with the Oxbridge colleges that were the
subject of so much litigation in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, the general administrative framework of universities has
changed surprisingly little: in England, particularly, a compromise
has been sought between a 'community of scholars' and an
unashamedly bureaucratic organisation. The reluctance of these
large bodies to react to changing circumstances has probably been
one of the factors in the growing conflicts in universities generally.
Be that as it may, it is at least arguable that many of the functions
which were assigned to the visitor as long as three hundred years
ago still have some relevance; and in that regard it is sad to have to
note at this stage that the reaction of the Albertan legislature to the
decision in Vanek has been to abolish the office of visitor
altogether. 7 Notwithstanding that, Vanek must be examined to see
what light it sheds on the visitor generally: and there have indeed
been a number of comparatively recent Canadian, English and other
Commonwealth cases on the subject.
Bearing in mind what has been said in the last paragraph, it is
proposed in this article to discuss the origin and nature of visitatorial
jurisdiction, the scope of that jurisdiction and the extent to which it
is itself reviewable by the courts, and to consider how relevant (sic)
the visitor is to today's university.
A. The Originsof the Power
The original of all such [visitatorial] power is the property of the
donor and the power everyone has to direct, dispose and regulate
his own property.
Lord Hardwick in Green v. Rutherforth was dealing with the
jurisdiction of the visitor over grants of land to a corporation, but his
words apply to visitatorial jurisdiction generally. The type of
institution to which a visitor is attached is an "eleemosynary
corporation' ',8 that is to say, that type of lay corporation set up for
6. UniversitiesAmendmentAct, S.A. 1976, c.88, s.2
7. See, e.g. Act Respecting Memorial University of Newfoundland, R.S.N. 1970,
c.102, s.9
8. Green v. Rutherforth (1750), 1 Ves. Sen. 462 at 472; 27 E.R. 1144 at 1149
(Ch.)
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the purpose "ad studendum et ad orandum". Holt C. J. dissenting
in the King's Bench in the leading case of Philips v. Bury, 9 after
discussing the supervisory powers of the common law courts over
corporations that are "for public government" continued:
But private and particular corporations for charity, founded and
endowed by private persons, are subject to the private
government of those who erect them, and therefore if there be no
visitor appointed by the founder, I am of opinion that in all such
cases of eleemosynary corporations, the law doth appoint the
founder and his heirs to be visitors; the founder and his heirs are
patrons, and not to be known by common known laws and rules
of the kingdom; but such corporations are as to their own affairs
to be governed by the particular laws and constitutions assigned
them by the founder. 10
Thus the visitor is recognized as administering law distinct from the
ordinary law of the land: the law as laid down by the statutes or
charter of a university.
Clearly one is entitled to question the relevance of Lord Holt's
dictum to the modem university, which few would honestly regard
as "a private corporation for charity". The vast majority of the
relevant cases decided in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
dealt with Oxford and Cambridge Colleges, which tended to be
established for purposes which were de facto as well as de jure
"charitable", and were invariably privately endowed. Although it
was, and indeed, is true that "every college is a corporation in
itself, and altogether they form one corporation in the university in
gross","- nonetheless the two ancient universities are themselves
not eleemosynary but civil, the actual process of "studendum et
.. . orandum" being in the care of the individual colleges.
Consequently it would appear that they do not have visitors: hence
Dr. Bentley was able to obtain a writ of mandamus for the
restoration of his degrees.12 Modem universities, however, are
eleemosynary: the functions traditionally assigned to such corporations are in the hands of the universities themselves.1 3 For instance,
9. Phillips v. Bury (1962), 2 T.R. 346; 100 E.R. 186 (K.B.)
10. Id., at352, 189.
11. R. v. Gregory (1772), 4 T.R. 240a; 100 E.R. 995 (K.B.)
12. SeeR. v. Chancellorof Cambridge University (1723), 1 Str. 537, 93 E.R. 698
- and see R. v. Gregory, supra, where it is suggested that the University might
have claimed in their writ that they had a visitor. The importance of the writ, and of
procedure generally, is emphasized frequently; see, e.g. R. v Alsop (1682), 2
Show. K.B. 170; 89 E.R. 868: R v. Whaley (1740) 2 Str. 1139; 93 E.R. 1087.
13. See Vanek, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 429 at 437, per Clement J.A.
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the Act of 1821 incorporating the Governors of Dalhousie College,
described the college as existing "for the Education of Youth and
Students in the higher branches of Science and Literature" ,14 and in
R. v. Dunsheathexparte Meredith, 15 Lord Goddard C. J. held that,
for the purposes of visitatorial jurisdiction, London University
(which, consisting of a number of a semi-autonomous units,
provided a very strong case) did not differ from an Oxford or
Cambridge college.
Certain questions can be asked about the nature of the modem
university in relation to the origin of visitatorial juriadiction. The
basis of the jurisdiction is the right of the founder to establish his
own system of law, to be administered by himself and his heirs, or d
nominee. It has been argued that the nature of modem universities,
instituted and financed by the state, precludes the adoption of this
view of the fount of visitatorial power. 16 In the absence of any
express nomination (and of any founders' heirs) 17 it has been held
that the Crown is visitor, and that the visitatorial powers are to be
exercised in the Court of Chancery.1 8 This is indeed now recognised
by statute. Section 19(5) of the Judicature (Consolidation) Act
192519 provided that "there shall not be vested in the High Court
. . . [a]ny jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Lord Chancellor on
behalf of her late Majesty as visitor of any college or of any
charitable or other foundation." This jurisdiction applied equally to
institutions which have themselves been established by the Crown,
and to which no appointment as visitor has been made. Thus,
technically at the time of the Aston University case, 20 the Crown
was visitor, a point which was not, apparently, raised. Donaldson J.
was content to observe that no appointment had been made, and
clearly did not regard the matter as being outside the jurisdiction of
the High Court. 21
14. 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c.39
15. R. v.Dunsheath, exparte Meredith, [1951] 1 K.B. 127; [195012 All E.R. 741
16. Ouellette, supra, note I at 634
17. See R. v. Dr. Shippen, 8 Mod. 367; 88 E.R. 262, where the court did not
know who the founder, or visitor was.
18. SeeR. vBishop of Ely (1788), 2T.R. 290, 100 E.R. 157 (K.B.)
19. 15& 16Geo. 5, c.49
20. R. v Senate of the University of Aston, ex parte Roffey, [1969] 2 Q.B. 538,
[1969)2 All E.R. 964, (D.C.)
21. For discussion of the basis of the Crown's jurisdiction to visit in these
circumstances see, in particular, R. v. St. Catherine'sHall, Cambirdge (1741), 4
T.R. 233; 100 E.R. 991;R. v. Gregory, supra, note 119; and the judgment of Lord
Holt inAnonymous, 12 Mod. 232; 38 E.R. 1284 (K.B.).
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One must now consider the relevance of the role to Canadian
Universities without a specially appointed visitor. 22 Ouellette
discussed the varied functions of the Lord Chancellor, and pointed
out that there was no equivalent figure in the Canadian system. The
closest comparison he could find was the Minister of Education,
who was already visitor of several public schools. 23 However, the
peculiar nature of the office of Lord Chancellor is not really the
point. The Crown remains the significant figure: The Chancellor
acts in his capacity as Keeper of the Great Seal. The provincial
Lieutenant-Governor is a more obvious choice, being in a sense a
delegate-cum-representative of the Crown as the Lord Chancellor is
in this respect. The Lieutenant-Governor is indeed often appointed
visitor in his own right. Such is the case in Alberta:2 4 in Vanek 25 it
was argued that the Lieutenant-Governor stood in the position of the
Crown in England, and the High Court in the position of the Lord
Chancellor. Clement J.A. however ruled that in the absence of
express delegation, the Lieutenant-Governor and no-one else was
Visitor. 26 The position is different in Saskatchewan where,
although the Lieutenant-Governor is visitor, his powers are
statutorily exercisable, on his direction, by the Saskatchewan Court
27
of Queen's Bench.
Clearly the court in those circumstances is not acting in its normal
capacity: that would destroy the point of the rule laid down by the
1925 Act. At the same time the initial decision to vest visitatorial
authority in the Lord Chancellor rather than in the Court of King's
Bench may well have been swayed by considerations of the
inherently "charitable" nature of such eleemosynary foundations as
colleges. 2 8 In an early Canadian case, Re Wilson, 29 concerning a
plea for reinstatement by a dismissed professor, the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court doubted whether the nature of the "public"
22. Where the statute setting up a university is amended, to the exclusion of the
section concerning the visitor, it seems likely that a positive measure has been
taken to dispense with him: see Re Polten, (1975) 80.R. (2d) 271 (D.C.)
23. Ouellette, supra note I at 639
24. Universities Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 378, s.5
25. Supra, note 5
26. [1975] 5 W.W.R. 429 at443
27. Queen's Bench Act, 1970 R.S.S. 1970, c.73, s. 12(3)
28. At the same time one should not go too far, and regard them as spiritual rather
than lay corporations. See the judgment of Lord Holt noted supra, note 21; and also
R. v New College in Oxford (1672), 2 Lev 14; 83 E.R. 430; and R v. Brian and
Patrick(1678), 2 Keb. 66; 84 E.R. 41
29. Re Wilson (1885), 18 N.S.R. 180 (S.C.)
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institution with which they were dealing, King's College, Windsor,
made it possible for it to be subject to such absolute jurisdiction as
had been possessed by the visitors of Oxford Colleges. Thompson J.
pointed out that the College had not been "founded" in the sense
that the "private corporations of eleemosynary character" had
been, and went on to say:
This corporation, then, of governors, not being situated at all like
the fellows of an English University, not being the objects of the
Founder's bounty, but the administrators of that bounty, being in
fact put in the Founder's place, to administer the bounty, and to
make statutes on all matters respecting the College. 30
The majority in the Supreme Court gave a somewhat restricted
version of the visitor's powers, an attitude imposed on them by the
fact that the Bishop of Nova Scotia was not only Visitor but also a
member of the Board of Governors who made the decision in
question. Basically, the issue of whether the Crown's jurisdiction as
visitor is exercised by the Lord Chancellor or in the Queen's Bench
Division is one of policy. The Divisional Court is the home of the
prerogative writs, and the issue here is the administration of a
peculiar form of private law.
Connected with the question of the origin of visitatorial
jurisdiction is that of the appointment of particular visitors. It has
been seen that in the absence of an express, appointment to the
contrary, the founder and his heirs, or alternatively, the Crown,
have the power of visitation. Particular words are not required for
the establishment of a visitor. As Lord Hardwicke said in Att. Gen.
v. Talbot3 l "it is sufficient if the intention of the founder appears
32
who should be visitor, and technical words are not necessary".
The.intention of the founder was gauged, in this particular instance,
by the fact that the Chancellor of the University was entrusted with
the power of interpreting the statutes of the College (Clare Hall,
33
Cambridge) to the express exclusion of the founder's heir's.
The position in Canada seems to be as follows. An institution will
have been established by charter or by private or public Act 3 4 (and a
30. Id., at 196
31. Att. -Gen. v. Talbot (1747),3 Atk. 662; 26 E.R. 1181 (K.B.)
32. Id., at 673, 1187
33. An interesting case to compare with Re Wilson in connection with the
relationship between the visitor and the board is Eden v. Foster (1725), 2 P.Wms.
325; 24 E.R. 750 (Ch.).
34. E.g. McGill (charter); Memorial, supra, note 7, and see University of Toronto
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statute may have made general provision for universities as a whole,
in addition to the universities' individual charters).35 It is more than
likely that the visitor will be the Lieutenant-Governor and that his
powers will be very vaguely expressed, 36 but particularly in the case
of institutions with some denominational affiliation, it is not
unusual to find that bishops have been appointed, as is the case with
so many Oxbridge colleges. 3 7 An interesting point in connection
with provisions appointing Lieutenant-Governors as visitors is that
one not infrequently finds that the Lieutenant-Governor is expressly
given certain powers, presumably quite independent of visitatorial
authority, in relation to such matters as appointments of a
proportion (sometimes a considerable proportion) of the membership of the Board of Governors.38
B. VisitatorialJurisdiction
Whatever relates to the internal arrangements and dealings with
regard to the government and management of the house, of the
domus of the institution, is properly within the jurisdiction of the
visitor.
Sir Richard Kindersley's statement in Thomson v. University of
London 39 is the obvious starting-point for a discussion of visitatorial
power. Expressed in general terms, the principal question raised is
as to the nature of "internal arrangements and dealings" (with an
implied corollary: who constitutes the "domus"). Traditional and
well-established areas of jurisdiction included the resolution of
disputed elections to fellowships, and hearing complaints of the
corporators. These functions were part of his general duty to
interpret the statutes of the foundation. The settlement of disputes
concerning academic affairs has recently been re-asserted as being
40
within the visitor's province, though not without reservations.
More questionable areas include his jurisdiction over members of an
institution, whose relationship with it is deemed to be contractual
rather than that of corporators, and over disputes alleging a breach
of natural justice.
Act, S.O. 1871, c.56, originally S.O. 1833, c.89. In fact, as is often the case the
university was established initially by royal charter in 1827.
35. E.g. UniversitiesAct 1963, S.B.C. 1963, c.52
36. Supra, note 7
37. E.g. King's College, Nova Scotia; Bishop's University, Quebec
38. See e.g. supra, note 7, s. 108; and supra, note 35
39. Thomson v. University of London (1864), 33 L.J. Ch. 625 at 634
40. See Exparte Macfadyen (1945), 45 S.R. (N.S.W.) 200 (S.C.)
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The point should initially be made that Visitors are of two types:
special and general. If a person is appointed visitor of a college or
university, and no particular powers or limitations are imposed upon
him, it can be assumed that he is a general visitor with all the
customary incidents of visitatorial office: inspection of the charter
or statutes is the method of ascertainment here. 4 1 In the charter of
the University of Liverpool the visitor (the Queen in Parliament,
through the Lord President of the Council, a quite common form of
appointment) has the right "from time to time and in such manner
• . . as they shall think fit to direct an inspection of the University,
its buildings, laboratories and general equipment and also of the
examinations, teaching and other work done by the University."
Bridge is surely right in asserting that this type of formula denotes a
general visitor.42 Even in the case of a general visitor there may be
43
limits on the exercise of his power. Lord Holt in Philips v. Bury
(which concerned the power of the Bishop of Exeter, and visitor of
Exeter College, Oxford, to remove its master) gave an example of
this when discussing the two-pronged aspect of visitatorial power:
He cannot visit ex officio more than once in five years, but as
visitor he has a standing constant authority at all times to hear the
complaints and redress the grievances of the particular
members.44
"Hearing complaints and redressing grievances", and generally
solving disputes, are the subjects of this discussion. It would be
very unexpected nowadays for a visitor to exercise his jurisdiction,
undoubted after Philips v. Bury, to expel fellows. His intervention
would come, as Lord Holt said, out of his power "to hear appeals of
course". 4 5 Therefore it is difficult to agree with Thompson J.'s
assertion in Re Wilson that the removal is "the principal power of
the English visitor". 46 It should be noted that the visatorial role is
largely an appellate one, dealing with the merits of questions that
arise within a particular institution. However, a visitor may also act
in the capacity of a court of review supervising the decisions of
41. See St. John's College, Cambridge v. Todington (1757), 1 Burr. 158, 97 E.R.
245 (K.B.); See also Re Wilson (1885) 18 N.S.R. 180 at 195; and R. v. Blythe
(1698), 5 Mod. 404; 87 E.R. 732 (K.B.)
42. Bridge, supra, note 1 at 535
43. (1692), 2T.R. 346; 100E.R. 186
44. Id. at 348, 188
45. Id.
46. 18 N.S.R. 180, at200
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inferior tribunals. For instance, examination of the procedures of a
purported election to a college fellowship (historically one of the
visitor's most common tasks) would be better categorised as review
rather than appeal. Like tht reviewing courts in administrative law,
the visitor is concerned principally with statutory interpretation.
Dealing first with students, it has been established by a number of
cases that the visitor is the ultimate arbiter in matters concerning
examinations. The first case of this sort, Thomson v. University of
London4 7 concerned a claim for breach of contract by an
examination candidate who had been awarded first prize and a gold
medal, only to be informed, some years later, that the method of
marking which he had been led to believe by the Registrar of the
University was the correct one (an assurance he received before
entering for the examination) was in fact erroneous, and that on a
correct interpretation of the relevant rules, he should have come
second: accordingly, another medal was struck for the prize-winner,
and Thomson claimed a breach of the contract he had made with the
University based on his negotiations with the Registrar. Sir Richard
Kindersley, V.C. held that there was not in any legal sense, a
contract between the two parties: but his reason for declining to act
on behalf of the applicant (who was seeking an injunction to restrain
the awarding of the second medal) was that the issue was one for
visitatorial jurisdiction:
It is hardly possible to suggest any case which is more clearly
within the cognizance, and the exclusive cognizance, of the
visitor,
for the "holding of examinations and the conferring of degrees"
were "one, if not the main and only object of the University" .48
Similar views were expressed in Thorne v. University of
London, 4 9 which concerned a claim by a disappointed candidate for
the LL.B. degree who alleged that his papers had been negligently
marked and sought a mandamus to compel the award of his merited
degree. Diplock, L.J. relying, inter alia, on Thomson held that the
court had no jurisdiction to deal with such an issue, being an action
"relating to domestic disputes between members of the
University". 50 Diplock L.J. hinted at one possible justification for
47. (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 625
48. Id. at 634
49. Thorne v. University of London, [1966] 2 Q.B. 237; [1966] 2 All E.R. 338
(C.A.)
50. Id. at 242, 339
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the decision when he said "the High Court does not sit as a court of
appeal from university examiners." 5 1 Indeed, short of sitting down
and marking the papers themselves, it is hard to conceive how the
court could exercise such a jurisdiction, once it has been decided, as
it was in Thorne that the concept of a duty of care is inapplicable to
such a situation. It might be argued that the visitor is in no better
position as far as hearing an appeal of this nature is concerned, but
that is not the point. The point is that nobody bar the examiner
himself is in a position to make a judgment on a question of this
kind, subject to independent assessment in a doubtful case. The
visitor's responsibility in such a situation could be to appoint such
an independent assessor. 52 Quite apart from the issue of what a
visitor's powers should or should not be, it is surely questionable as
a matter of policy that every student who is dissatisfied with his
marks should be entitled to have the matter considered in the courts.
Reference may be made here to King v. University of
Saskatchewan.53 There a law student sought a mandamus to compel
the University to grant him a degree. Johnson J. of the Court of
Queen's Bench held that the matter came within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Visitor. Neither the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal, nor the Supreme Court of Canada, who both held that the
court did in fact have jurisdiction, felt it necessary to contradict
Johnson J. on this matter. Rather they held that what King sought at
this stage was not the actual conferring of the degree, but the
performance of the public duty imposed by the University Act on
the University Council to determine properly his appeal against the
examiners' decision.
In King then, the traditional area of visitorial jurisdiction
remained substantially unimpaired. Such was not the case with an
earlier Commonwealth decision, Ex parte MacFadyen.5 4 Here a
student who failed some examinations was refused a deferred
examination. Having unsuccessfully appealed to the Dean of his
Faculty (Dentistry) and to the Senate, on the grounds that his failure
and the refusal to let him take the deferred examination were
51. Id. at 243,339
52. It should be remembered that "in matters in which the corporators have a
discretion, the visitor should not interfere if the discretion has been exercised
fairly.": Bridge, supra note 1 at 541
53. King v. University of Saskatchewan, [1969] S.C.R. 678, 6 D.L.R. (3d) 120,
68 W.W.R. 745; affirming (1969) 1 D.L.R. 321, 67 W.W.R. 126 (Sask. C.A.),
affirming (1969) 66 W.W.R. 505 (Sask. Q.B.)
54. Supra, note 40
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motivated by personal vindictiveness, he finally petitioned the
Governor of New South Wales, who by virtue of section 17 of the
University and University Colleges Act 1900-1951, was visitor of
the University of Sydney, "with authority to do all things that
pertain to visitors as often as he deems meet. ' 5 5 The Governor
refused to intervene, and the student applied for a rule nisi for the
issue of a mandamus to compel him to act. Neither of the judgments
delivered was prepared to take the claim that this was an area in
which the visitor might have exclusive jurisdiction seriously. Halse
Rogers J. said of the Governor's appointment that:
it was never contemplated by the Legislature or by anybody
from the time the Act was passed until quite recently, that it did
anything more than
give the Governor an official connection with
56
the University.
The decisive factor for the court seemed to be section 14(2) of the
Act which provided that "[t]he management of the affairs, concerns
and property of the University is vested entirely in the Senate."
This is certainly unusually sweeping. The Senate seems to have the
combined roles of Senate and Board of Governors, a view which is
confirmed by looking at its composition. Out of a membership of
26, only 5 Fellows were to be "representative of the teaching staff
of the University." There are, in the manner of Australian electoral
rules, procedural requirements concerning the election of Fellows
designed to test the analytical skills of the most determined
psephologist and Davidson J. admitted that the court might well
compel the visitor not to decide an electoral dispute. 57 However the
court's decision not to interfere in the instant case seems to have
been based more on policy than law.
The policy, however, is basically sound. The courts can be
reluctant to state the perfectly reasonable view that nobody is really
capable of acting as a court of appeal against a decision involving
simply a failure in an examination. Admittedly the court in
MacFadyen were a good deal firmer on this point than the Court of
Appeal in Thorne, 58 but even so they were dealing with a case
which primafacie was justiciable by the visitor. A major problem
was the size of the corporate body itself, which consisted solely of
the Senate of 26 Fellows, and if one accepts that visitatorial
55.
56.
57.
58.

ActNo. 22, 1900
(1945), 45 S.R. (N.S.W.) 200
Id. at s. 202
Supra, note 49
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jurisdiction is to concern itself solely with the acts and omissions of
corporators, clearly that jurisdiction is in this case limited almost to
the point of extinction. However if one regards it as the most
significant part of visitorial jurisdiction that he should be an
interpreter of the University's statutes and guard against their abuse;
especially with regard to what is so obviously an "internal matter",
it is difficult to see how he cannot have jurisdiction here when he is
invoked by a member of the university. 59 In such circumstances one
can only agree with the recent comment that the better view is that
"locus standi is determined solely by reference to the subject-matter
of the issue, and that the status of the petitioner is irrelevant." 6 0 A
danger there would be that the visitor might be bombarded with
complaints by rejected applicants for admission.
This is one of the problem areas of visitatorial jurisdiction over
students: that of locus standi. There are two others relating
particularly to examinations. The first implicitly raised in Thorne is
whether malice rather than negligence, is the charge against the
examiner. For instance, it is stated in R. v. Askew, 6 1 a case
concerning the admission of a male midwife to the College of
physicians, that the conduct of the college or any similar
corporation "ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced, not
arbitrary, capricious or biassed, much less warped by resentment or
personal dislike.''62 The question is essentially one of discretion:
where an examiner, or an admissions committee, or an appointments or tenure committee has acted in good faith, has taken into
account all relevant considerations and disregarded all irrelevant
ones, and has acted in all other ways with full regard to the
established conventions relating to the exercise of discretionary
power, the mere existence of locus standi before the visitor will not
compel him to intervene. The implication of the argument in Thorne
is that where a candidate is 'dishonestly or capriciously" excluded
from a professional body his remedy is with the courts. This might
well be the situation regarding admission to a university, for it is
questionable whether somebody who is not a member has locus
standi before the visitor.
59. The court's view of the University's statutes was that they should not be
regarded as encouraging students to appeal to the visitor: supra. note 40 at 205.
Halse Rogers and Davidson JJ. also took an unfavourable view of visitor in Ex
ParteKing:Re Univ. Sydney (1944), 44 S.R. (N.S.W.) 19
60. Christie, "Jurisdiction and Natural Justice" (1974), 37 Mod. L.R. 324 at 325
61. R. v. Askew et al. (1768), 4 Burr. 2186, 98 E.R. 139 (K.B.)
62. Id. at 2180, 141
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The other area of doubt concerns the situation where a system of
appeals from a decision regarding examinations has been
established and the procedure followed involves some breach of the
rules of natural justice. The question of availability of redress in the
courts, despite the existence of a visitor, in the event of a breach of
natural justice by some inferior tribunal will be discussed later.
The question of standing will also be discussed later. It concerns
students who are not corporators, and applicants for admission.
When the question is one of admission, or re-admission into a
faculty, of a student who is still, or already, a member of the
university, the question of standing does not arise. This was
determined in a recent Quebec case in which greater regard was had
for the office of visitor than had previously been observed in "la
belle province". In Langlois v. Rector and Members of Laval
University.6 3 Rinfret J.A. of the Quebec Court of Appeal has no
doubt that the question whether a law student who had failed to
secure the necessary credits in his first year but had nonetheless
been permitted, erroneously, to enter his second year, should be
allowed to continue there, or obliged to take his first year again, was
an "internal matter" within the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor.
In that view he contrasted with another Quebec judge, Brossard J.
who in Fekete (1969), expressed amazement that "more than one
hundred years" after Confederation it could seriously be argued that
the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted by that of the Royal
Visitor. 64 In that case a McGill undergraduate, who had participated
in the publication of an offensive edition of a student newspaper,
sought a writ of evocation (replacing in Quebec the order of
certiorari and prohibition) to prohibit further proceedings of the
Committee on Student Discipline on the grounds, inter alia that
"the proceedings before it are affected by gross irregularities and
there is reason to believe that justice will not be done" (the wording
of the relevant statutory provision, article 846 of the Quebec Civil
Code6 5). Notwithstanding his views on the visitor, Brossard J. (with
whom the other members of the Court agreed) was adamant that the
Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the proceedings of the
Court of Discipline. Apart from the matter of visitatorial
jurisdiction, the question before the court in Fekete was whether the
63. Langlois v. Rector and Members of Laval University (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d)
674 (Que. C.A.)
64. (1969) 2 D.L.R. 3d 127
65. 4S.Q. 1965, c.80
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nature of the disciplinary body was such as to leave itself open to
review by the Court under two particular provisions of the Civil
Code i.e. namely Articles 846 and 33. The former which dealt with
the remedy of evocation to prohibit further proceedings in certain
circumstances, such as want or excess of jurisdiction, or a breach of
natural justice, dealt solely with courts subject to the superintending
and reforming power of the Superior Court: in effect to statutory
bodies. Article 33 vested in the Superior Court a superintending and
reforming power over, inter alia, "bodies politic and corporate"
which admittedly included the "Committee of Student Discipline"
at McGill. However the power did not extend, in the case of bodies
politic and corporate, to the remedy of evocation before judgment,
specifically provided in the case of "courts" by article 846, and the
court in the instant case decided that it had no power to interfere.
Rinfret J.A. in Langlois specifically held that the power of
supervision bestowed on the court by that article did not exclude the
jurisdiction of the visitor, and that in any case "insincerity, fraud or
a substantial error on the part of the respondents amounting to fraud
or a denial of justice" would have to be established before article 33
could be invoked. 66 This was done in neither case.
Here is observed the difficulty of stating general rules of
"university law" because of the diversity of institutions and
jurisdictions. Generally one speaks of the court's jurisdiction being
ousted by the visitor; in Quebec, in the light of these two cases, it is
justified to talk of the visitor's jurisdiction being excluded by the
court, and the implication of Rinfret J.A.'s remarks is that in the
event of "insincerity, fraud or a substantial error. . ." even in the
academic sphere, the courts and not the visitor have jurisdiction.
The policy considerations of all this have been discussed already.
Incidentally, the provisions of article 33 itself seem to accord with
the general view of the scope of visitatorial jurisdiction. The
superintending and reforming power does not apply to "matters
declared by law to be of the exclusive competency of such courts or
of any one of the latter" (this is negligent drafting but it presumably
includes bodies politic and corporate) "and save in cases where
jurisdiction resulting from this article is excluded by some provision
of a general or special law" (emphasis added).
Fekete raises, almost by accident in the light of the court's
attitude towards the visitor, the question of his role in relation to
66. Supra, note 63 at 682
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student discipline, as opposed to academic matters. There seems to
be no reason why, in the field of general discipline, as well as that
of academic matters, a "practical" visitor could not perform the
tasks of "reforming and superintending" as well as any court.
However, it must be admitted that, although Ouellette maintains
that visitatorial jurisdiction, ratione materiae, "extends, according
to the case-law, not only to academic questions, but more generally
to questions of.

.

. discipline" ,67 the authority supporting the latter

part of the proposition can hardly be described as modern. 68 A
visitor might have a useful function as an ultimate and, one would
hope, demonstrably impartial appellate tribunal. In major incidents,
of course, the law of the land might be involved: in such cases the
visitor's jurisdiction could not be regarded as exclusive.
It has been recognised, at least, since Philips v. Bury6 9 that the
visitor has the power to dismiss academic staff, though it would be
unusual to find him exercising it nowadays. The visitor certainly
had general supervisory powers over questions of dismissal. Hence
in Ex parte Thomas Lamprey70 the Lord Chancellor of the day
(1737) acted as visitor of Christ Church, Oxford and decided that it
was reasonable on the part of the Dean to have deprived a chaplain
of his office for having married. In the early Canadian cases on
tenure it was generally held (a notable exception being Re Wilson7 1 )
that, appeal against dismissal lay to the visitor: though in only one
such case, In re the University Act 72 (where three judges of the
Saskatchewan Court of King's Bench sat as visitor to the University
of Saskatchewan), was this means of redress in fact employed.
Hagerty J. in Weir v. Mathieson73 (in which a professor sought an
injunction from the Court of Chancery for his reinstatement)
accepted the definition of visitatorial power given in Lewin's
Trusts:
With the visitatorial powers the Court of Chancery has nothing
to do, (the office of visitor being to hear and determine all
67. Ouellette, supra, note 1 at 639 (author's translation)
68. The most recent authority seems to be Green v. The Master and Fellows of St.
Peter'sCollege, Cambridgeet al. (1896), 31 L.J. 119 (H.C.)
69. (1692)2T.R. 346; 100 E.R. 186
70. Exparte Thomas Lamprey (1737), West t. Hard. 209; 25 E.R. 899 (Ch.)
71. (1885), 18N.S.R. 180
72. In re the University Act, In re the University of Saskatchewan and MacLaurin,
[1920] 2 W.W.R. 823
73. Weir v. Mathieson (1865), 11 G.C.R. 383 (Ch.); reversed (1866), 3 G.E. &
A.R.! 123
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differences of the members of the society among themselves, and
generally to superintend the internal government of the body, and
to see that all rules and orders of the corporation are observed), it
is only as respects the administration of the corporate
74 property
that equity assumes to itself any right of interference.
Hence the court of appeal held that the fact that Professor Weir was
paid out of the general revenue of the college rather than out of a
special fund set aside for his office (which was not an integral part
of the college) precluded the exercise of the court's jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Ex parte Jacob,75 the New Brunswick Supreme
Court refused to quash the dismissal of a Professor of Divinity by
the Senate (in whom, subject to the approval of the Governor in
Council were vested all necessary powers for the management of the
University [of New Brunswick]'s affairs,) firstly on the grounds that
the Senate's action was not a judicial act, and secondly, on the
ground that the matter came within the exclusive cognizance of the
Lieutenant-Governor as Visitor. The three judges of the Saskatchewan Court of King's Bench who reviewed the dismissal of
Professors MacLaurin, Hogg and MacKay, and Mr. Greenway,
were clearly of the opinion that the matter was one of visitatorial
jurisdiction, although at the same time they felt bound by the Law as
laid down in Re Wilson. They came to the conclusion that they had
no power to intervene "unless the president or governors exercised
their discretion of removal in an oppressive manner or from a
corrupt or indirect motive",76 another reference to the fact that the
visitor cannot act when the corporators have acted with their
discretion.
Another area which seems to fall within the scope of his
visitatorial jurisdiction is the terms of a particular appointment.
Thus, in Att.-Gen. v. Stephens, 7 7 the main question was whether a
fellow who had been elected to a travelling fellowship, and after
having been paid for the first five years was prevented by ill-health
from fulfilling the travelling requirements attached to the donation,
should refund the amount received. Lord Hardwicke L.C. held that
to require that would be inequitable and went on to say:
There are two other matters (1) whether the travelling fellows
must be members of the college; (2) whether they have the power
74.
75.
76.
77.

3G.E.&A.R. 123 at 147
ExparteJacob(1861), 10 N.B.R. 153 (S.C.)
[1920]2 W.W.R. 823, at 827
Att.-Gen. v. Stephens (1787), 1 Atk. 358; 26 E.R. 228
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to let the chambers which they hold in the right of the fellowship.
As to these matters, they are not properly the object of this
court's 7jurisdiction,
but ought rather to be determined by the
8
visitor.
This illustrates the distinction brought out in a number of cases
between the court's jurisdiction over, for instance, an independent
trust fund, and the visitor's jurisdiction over internal matters such as
the conditions of fellowships. The internal matters such as the
conditions of fellowships. The North American institution of tenure
could be described as such a condition, and Cavanagh J. in Vanek
specifically said that "the tenure procedure at the University of
Alberta is clearly a domestic issue of the university and thus falls
within the province of the visitor to the exclusion of the courts. 79
There are circumstances, when a question involving the granting of
tenure fits more nearly into the jurisdiction covering dismissals
rather than that concerning conditions of employment, in the sense
that a refusal to grant tenure may be tantamount to termination of
employment.
In jurisdictions where tenure, as such, is not known, disputes
tend to be centred on questions of re-appointment and promotion.
The most resounding vindication of visitatorial jurisdiction in
England since the eighteenth century was made by Lord Goddard
C.J. in R. v. Dunsheath, ex parte Meredith,80 which was
concerned, generally, with the failure to renew the contract of a
lecturer at the London School of Economics. Discussing the scope
of visitatorial jurisdiction, Lord Goddard, in refusing to grant a
mandamus compelling the clerk of the Convocation of the
University to summon an extraordinary meeting thereof, said:
The question [regarding that jurisdiction] has generally arisen
with regard to the election to fellowships, but I see no difference
in principle between the question whether a particular person is a
fit and proper person8 to be appointed or retained as a teacher at a
university of school. 1
Similarly in Bell v. University of Auckland 82 the question arose
whether the conditions laid down for the settlement of applications
for promotion, which in the instant case did not appear to have been
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 360,229
[197413 W.W.R. 167 at 176
[1951] 1 K.B. 127
Id. at 132
Bell v. UniversityofAukland, [1969] N.Z.L.R. 1029 (S.C.)
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complied with, were an internal matter to be dealt with by the
visitor. This was one of the contract cases and can be more
conveniently discussed under locus standi, but Turner J. made some
general comments about visitatorial powers. The university had
asserted that the plaintiff's statement of claim seeking a declaration
for breach of contract should be struck out because the court's
jurisdiction was taken away by section 5 of the University of
Auckland Act 1961, which provided that: "The Governor-General
shall be visitor of the University, and shall have all the powers and
functions usually possessed by Visitors." Turner J. denied that the
visitatorial role was "ceremonial rather than functional" 83 but felt
unable to decide at that stage in the proceedings (evidence being
incomplete) whether the case in question was within the visitor's
province as delineated by the English case-law. The contractual
element in the case inclined Turner J. to feel that the matter in
question was less obviously internal than those that arose in Thorne,
Dunsheath and King.
Bridge argues 84 that the case should fall within the same class as
Dunsheath, relating to promotion as opposed to reappointment, and
certainly this would seem to follow logically from Lord Goddard's
own extension of the case-law quoted above. However that was
strictly only obiter dictum, for although Turner J. said that
Dunsheath was concerned with "the propriety of a decision of a
governing body of a university not to renew a teaching
appointment",85 the case itself was in fact brought to compel an
officer of the University to call a meeting of Convocation. The
question of the visitor's jurisdiction over the lecturer's appointment
was not directly in issue, and in fact the action was not brought by
the lecturer himself but by a member of Convocation, and the
problem of the overlap between the visitor's jurisdiction and the
Courts' was not present: though presumably it might have been, if it
had been decided on terms assigned to it by Turner J..
Dunsheath also resembles King in that the clerk of Convocation
was under a statutory duty to convene it in certain circumstances. 86
Nonetheless the dispute in question was held to be a purely domestic
matter within the visitor's jurisdiction, and it was specifically stated
by Lord Goddard that the principles of the law regarding that
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1031-1032
Supra, note 1 at 593
[1969] N.Z.L.R. 1029 at 1033
See [1951] 1 K.B. 127 at 128
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jurisdiction applied equally to chartered and statutory corporations.
This is a preferable solution to that in King, where the court became
entangled with the juridical dichotomy inherent in the university,
and noted by Fridman.,8 7 between its private and public aspects.
This dichotomy, and the problems that it poses for the courts was
demonstrated by reasoning both in the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court to the effect that although the
conferring of a degree was an essentially "private"
and
"domestic" act, and conferring, or at least the consideration or
procedure of conferring, might be enforced by the prerogative
remedy of mandamus, so it was in effect held that there were
circumstances in which judicial intervention into the area of
examinations would be justified: however, the real issue in King
was the applicability of the rules of natural justice.
C. Areas ofDoubt
It is becoming apparent that there are a number of "grey areas" of
visitatorial jurisdiction, where it is hard to say with certainty
whether the court or the visitor is the correct arbiter.
There are some areas which clearly do not involve matters "with
regard to the . . . management of the domus, of the institution" as
that phrase has come to be interpreted by the courts. One such area,
implied already, is the law of trusts. For instance, in Green v.
Rutherforth it was held that property devised to a college years after
its foundation and under a special trust was not subject to visitatorial
jurisdiction as
the visitor has authority to judge only according to the statutes
of the foundress and is restrained from acting
otherwise;
88
consequently he has no power to exercise the trust
(by deciding on the presentation of a divinity fellow from the
college as rector of a parish). In Att.-Gen. v. Magdalen College
Oxford, 8 9 on the other hand, Lord Langdale M.R. held that the
appointment of the officials to a school run by the college was a
matter of internal management to be regulated by the visitor rather
than a trust to be administered in Chancery.
87. See "Judicial Intervention into Universities Affairs", (1973) 21 Chitty's L.J.
181
88. Supra, note 8 at 472, 1150,perLord Hardwicke, L.C.
89. Att.-Gen. v. Magdalen College, Oxford (1847) 10 Beav. 402, 50 E.R. 637

(Ch)
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As noted above, dismissed professors have occasionally based a
right to be reinstated on the argument that their status derived from a
trust that by-passed visitatorial jurisdiction. In Weir v. Mathiesona °
this claim was dismissed on the ground that the post in question had
no specific funds annexed to it. There are, however, reasons of
principle and convenience, as well as the technicalities of the law of
trusts behind such a decision. Lord Hardwicke L.C., in Green v.
Rutherforth discussed this point. It had been argued before him that,
on the authority of his own decision inAtt.-Gen. v. Talbot9 l (which
settled the right of the visitor to determine disputed elections to
fellowships) the donation in question, and the rights attached to it,
should be subject to visitatorial authority. In the earlier case,
however,
[t]here was a plain implication to subject to the general
visitatorial power to avoid confusion, which would arise, if every
one coming in as a Fellow should not be subject to College
discipline; and in 2 Jo. 175, it was determined, that power of
explusion includes power of admission. I... indeed laid weight
on the inconveniences which might arise from a different
decision, which were obvious but different from the present, for
it is not so necessary here, that every special trust, consisting of
various parts, should be subject to
the jurisdiction of that visitor,
92
nor will the like confusion ensue.
Another area where visitatorial jurisdiction is circumscribed
concerns the law of the land. The visitor was "created" to
administer a system of private law based on the statutes of a
particular institution. When that institution is involved in a dispute
which, while seemingly internal, is in fact concerned with the
general law, it is only natural that the proper forum for adjudication
should be the courts. Hence, when in 1693, a number of fellows of
St. John's College, Cambridge refused to take oaths of allegiance to
William and Mary, a mandamus was granted compelling the master
to receive them, the court holding that:
The visitor is made by founder and is a proper judge of the
private laws of the college, he is to determine offences against
those laws. But where the law of the land is disobeyed, this Court
will take notice thereof, notwithstanding the visitor. 93
90.
91.
92.
93.
371

(1886) 3 G.C.E. & A.R. 123
(1747) 3 Atk. 662; 26 E.R. 1181
(1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 462 at 475; 27 E.R., 1144 at 1151 (K.B.)
R. v. St. John'sCollege, Cambridge (1693), 4 Mod. 233; 87 E.R. 366, at 241,
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The overlap between the domestic matters of the university and
the general law of the land (an aspect of the public-private
dichotomy discussed earlier), seen in its most thorny aspect in King
is also present in the third area where visitatorial jurisdiction
becomes blurred, that of contracts. Here there are clearly many
cases outside visitatorial jurisdiction: for instance transactions made
with external parties. An early instance was R. v. Windham 94 where
a mandamus was issued compelling the master of Wadham College
Oxford to affix the college seal to an agreement for a lease made
between the fellows and a third party. Lord Mansfield C.J. said:
the visitor acquiesces in the application for a mandamus. For
who could ever entertain a thought or idea of this being a dispute
proper for the visitor to decide. It is not a private dispute, but a
suit by a third person against the whole body, for the specific
performance of an agreement. An application to the visitor in
such a case is nugatory: for he cannot compel a specific
performance. 95
However most of the cases that have arisen have not been so
easily disposed of. This is because, when the contract in question is
made by the university and one of its academic members, it is a nice
point whether the agreement is one "relating to the internal
arrangements and dealings with regard to the government and
management of the domus.96 When the action in question is simply
one by an unretained member of staff for damages for breach of
contract and it is accepted by both sides that the period of
employment has terminated the courts (in the absence of some
arrangement between parties) would be the proper forum for
adjudication.
Equally might this be true of a case such as Simon Fraser
University v. Juliani,97 Where at the conclusion of a dispute
between the university and its "Resident in Theatre Arts" as to
whether or not he had resigned, he was allowed to continue,
theoretically, in his position, with full pay, until December 31st
1969 on condition that he did not set foot on the campus, other than
as a member of the public, after May 15th. The university was
granted an injunction to prevent the defendant from breaking the
latter provision of the contract, which was as Bridge says, "in a
94.
95.
96.
97.

R. v.Dr. Windham (1776), 1 Cowp. 377; 98 E.R. 1139 (Ch.)
Id. at378, 1140
Supra, note 39
Simon FraserUniversity v. Juliani(1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 670 (B.C.S.C.)
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sense external to his relationship with the university and was indeed
expressly designed to keep him away from it. '"98 In general,
however, a number of cases suggest that in matters relating to
contracts between the university and its academic members, the
visitor remains the ultimate authority.
The earliest case in which the issue was raised was Thomson v.
University of London, 9 9 discussed above. The plaintiff there
claimed for a breach of contract made between him and the
university. Sir Richard Kindersley V.C. held that to call the
relationship a legal contract was a misnomer. Even if the
relationship in question was contractual (he said) the contract was
one relating to the internal affairs of the university and hence subject
to visitatorial jurisdiction. Thomson is peculiar in that the agreement
involved was much more limited than one would normally find,
being concerned simply with the taking a particular examination.
The vice-chancellor himself noted this, contrasting Thomson's
situation with that of an Oxbridge undergraduate, who would pay
much more money for his membership of the university. Moreover,
he denied that such an undergraduate would be in a contractual
relationship as such: "for his status he pays very considerably."1 0 0
The problem of the relationship between the student and the
university is more relevant to the question of a student's locus standi
before the courts than to his position vis-a-vis the visitor. As far as
the latter is concerned, Christie's attitude mentioned above, 101 that
the subject matter of the dispute rather than the "status" of the
complainant should be the deciding factor, is sensible. This has
usually been the case, historically, given the fact that the visitor's
principal task is the interpretation of university statutes. It is only
the unexpected resuscitation of the visitor at the hands of Professor
Bridge, coinciding with the academic interest in the student's
standing with the courts, and the prompt arrival of a case, Herring
v. Templeman, 10 2 in which both issues were fleetingly raised, that
has enabled them to become enmeshed.
Herring involved allegations of breaches of natural justice by
various bodies, brought by a student at a teacher training college
98. Bridge, supra, note 1 at 544
99. (1864), 33 L.J. Ch. 625. See also Att.-Gen. v. Talbot (1747), 3 Atk. 662; 26
E.R. 1181, at 675, 1187
100. Id. at 638
101. Supra, note 60
102. Herring v. Templeman, [1973] 2 All E.R. 581 (Ch.), affd on different
grounds [1973] 3 All E.R. 569 (C.A.)

670 The Dalhousie Law Journal

who was expelled for failure in the practical side of his course.
Brightman J. of the Chancery Division (to whom the plaintiff
applied for a declaration, an injunction to re-admit him, and
damages) treated the case as being in the line of cases fromAtt-Gen.
v. Talbot to Thorne, and held that the matter fell within the
cognizance of the visitor.
On appeal, however, .it was realised that the college was not a
corporation in the sense that most colleges and universities are: it
was a trust, and did not have any "members" as such. Therefore
the plaintiff changed his plea to one of breach of contract: the
college maintained that even so exclusive jurisdiction lay with the
visitor. The Court of Appeal, however, were uncertain
what, (if any) is the authority that appertains to the office of
visitor in the case of an endowed college which is subject to the
visitation of the ordinary in connection with a dispute such as the
present, involving an alleged breach of contract between the
governing body and a person who, though a student under tuition
and training at the college is in no position of membership. 103
Therefore the issue was left unresolved, which was a pity, as, in
Brightman J.'s words "in none of the reported cases . . . did the
issue of natural justice arise". 10 4 Russell L.J. agreed that the
student-institution relationship was contractual, but that has not
been the issue in most of the cases involving the visitor. In King, 1for
05
example, Spence J. left the question of breach of contract open.
If one argues that the university's power to discipline students is
contractually based, it is reasonable to assume that such an
agreement, being based on the university's charter and statutes, is
'internal': The same argument could be applied to professorial
contracts. The only questionable area of locus standi for students
should be in relation to admissions, and "membership" should be
reasonably construed.
The relationship between the university and its academic staff is
clearly contractual. Yet even here, matters concerning the
relationship but relating to the internal management of the
institution have, as noted above, been held to come within the
exclusive cognizance of the visitor; and as in the student cases, the
contractual question itself is often said not to be strictly relevant.
Clement J.A. upholding Cavanagh J.'s judgment in Vanek, said:
103. [1973)3 All E.R. 569 at 572, per Russell L.
104. [197312 All E.R. 581 at 589
105. [1969] S.C.R. 678 at 686, 68 W.W.R.645 at 653
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These proceedings do not raise the contractual aspect of the
relationship between Vanek and the board, and indeed certiorari
does not provide a remedy for breach of contract. They are taken
on the footing that the provisions in the [faculty] handbook...
are regulations of the university which are to be given their
proper effect quite apart from any consensual operation. 10 6
Where breach of contract has been alleged, equivocal response
has been made by the courts as to the authority of the visitor. This
happened in Bell, mentioned above, where a lecturer whose
application for promotion was rejected by means different from
those that the university had undertaken to follow, claimed that his
contract had been breached. Turner J. was unable, at that stage to
say for certain that
on no conceivable presentation of the plaintiff's case could the
evidence turn out to support a claim of breach of contract in
respect of which the Court's jurisdiction would not be ousted by
that of the visitor. 107

Bridge asserts 0 8 that in the light of Dunsheath and Juliani the
contract would be regarded as falling within Kindersley V-C's class
of contracts relating to the internal management of the domus.
Fridman, on the other hand, doubts whether the contractual
relationship is a wholly domestic issue, from which the courts are
excluded. 10 9 However, it is probable that the motive behind this
(and certainly behind Wade's belief that the student-institution
relationship is contractual' 10 ) is the conviction that the prerogative
orders are inapplicable - as efficacious a route to justice as the
declaration, the injunction or damages, would be by way of appeal
to the visitor.
The question then arises: Who can appeal? The visitor's powers
ratione materiae have already been discussed. Ratione Personae
jurisdiction has traditionally been limited to the corporators, which
as a rule means academic staff, and students where they are
106. [1975] 5 W.W.R. 429 at 434. The same could be said of regulations
concerning student discipline. Although discipline is said to be contractually based,
in the sense that students are required to agree to observe ordinances, etc. before
coming into residence, such agreement may be fairly illusory, bearing in mind the
relative bargaining positions of the parties. Here, the regulations had at least been
agreed to by the faculty association.
107. [1969]N.Z.L.R. 1029, at 1033
108. Supra, note I at 543
109. Fridman, "The Nature of a Professorial Contract", supra, Chapter 1, note 22
at 20
110. See Wade, "Judicial Control of Universities" (1969), 85 L.Q.R. 468
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members of the institution. An example of a case where students
were for this reason prevented from appealing to the visitor is Ex
parte Davison (1772), cited in R v. Grundon.111 The latter case
concerned the right of a "boarder", the prosecutor in a claim for
assault, to remain in college after being given notice to quit. Lord
Mansfield relied on Davison where it was held that visitatorial
jurisdiction was limited to the foundation, and that "independent
members" had no recourse to the visitor. Davison, a commoner,
had been sent down from University College, Oxford, one term
before completing his degree. He appealed to the Lord Chancellor
as visitor ("University College being of Royal Foundation").112
The College having protested against certain statements in
Davison's petition, the question became one of whether the matter
was for visitatorial jurisdiction at all. The college argued that it was
an eleemosynary foundation limited to a master and twelve fellows,
and that strangers to the foundation had to rely for redress of their
grievances on the ordinary laws of the land. Davison alleged that
"the visitor's jurisdiction is confined to the foundation, but
comprises the whole government of the college." 113 The position of
"independent members" was sufficiently described by the statutes
of the university (for instance a degree could only be awarded to
someone who was a member of a college) for such members to
come within the jurisdiction. The Lord Chancellor dismissed the
petition.
Christie takes issue with Bridge's view, based on Davison, that
visitatorial jurisdiction is limited to corporators. He maintains that
the use of the word "member" in such cases as Thomson, and St.
John's College, Cambridge v. Todington, 114 in relation to locus
standi before the visitor, can be explained by the fact that most
petitioners will be, technically "members" of the institutions in
question. L 5 From the standpoint of common sense there is much to
be said for Christie's view, if the visitor is to be a workable
adjudicator: and students are often now specified as "members" of
the university in the charter. A complicating factor is the method,
employed by both Bridge and Ouellette of looking at visitatorial
111. R. v. Grundon (1775), 1 Cowp. 315; 98 E.R. 1105 (K.B.). Exparte Davison
is cited at 319
112. 1 Cowp. 315 at 319; 98 E.R. 1105 at 1108
113. Id. at320, 1108
114. (1757) 1 Burr. 158; 97 E.R. 245
115. 37 Mod. L. Rev. 324 at 326
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jurisdiction from two angles, "ratione materiae" and "ratione
personae" - to put it another way the scope of that authority is to
be looked at from the viewpoint both of the personnel, and the
subject-matter, to which it extends. The question of admissions,
while seemingly to fall within Kindersley V.-C.'s "internal"
category, can presumably not be brought before the visitor by a
rejected candidate, who is not a "member" in even the loosest
sense. It is probably mistaken to treat the above cases as cases on
locus standi at all. The question is essentially one of jurisdiction
rather than standing. If the student is a member of the university, in
the widest sense, the visitor has jurisdiction.
The problem of admissions is essentially one of discretion. Much
more justiciable was the issue of elections to fellowships which
also, as Christie points out, raises questions of entitlement to
membership. For instance, in R. v. Hertford College, Oxford, 1 6 a
candidate for a fellowship restricted to members of specified
churches, who was not a member of one of them, was told that even
if he came first in the examination he would not be elected. He did
not enter, but after results had been declared he sought a mandamus
compelling the college (established by statute in 1874) to examine
him. In this he was, not surprisingly or unreasonably, unsuccessful.
Lord Coleridge C.J. held, firstly, that there was no refusal to
examine him - the college were quite prepared to examine him but
on the terms mentioned above; secondly, even if they had refused,
the office was now adequately filled and the court was not going to
interfere with the college's reasonable, and discretionary decision;
and thirdly, the plaintiff's proper remedy, "if any" was an appeal
to the visitor:
There are cases directly on point, and of great weight, which
show that the authority of the visitor is as complete over
admissions to fellowships as over a motion from or deprivation of
17
them.'
He cited as examples St. John's College v. Todington, and other
cases where elections were disputed and mentioned an instance
where
the college of which I was a fellow was ordered . . . by the
visitor to admit, and did admit to a fellowship, a gentleman
whom the college had rejected upon grounds which the visitor,
116. [1878]3Q.B.D.693at701
117. Id. at 701-702

674 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the Bishop of Exeter, deemed insufficient1 18and against which the
rejected candidate successfully appealed.
As Christie points out not only these cases but also Thomson
supports the proposition that petitioners before the visitor need not
be corporators. Thomson was simply taking the LL.D. examination:
he was not a member of the University in the fullest sense.
According to Kindersley V.-C. visitatorial jurisdiction extended to
cover those:
who are either actually members of the University or who
come in and subject themselves to be at least pro hac vice,
members of the University. 119

Again "ratione materiae" and "ratione personage" seem to
conflict. Ex parte Davison, the only case definitely supporting
Bridge can be doubted as a general authority not only for the
antiquated distinction between commoners and scholars, but also on
the grounds of the separation, in Oxbridge, of the eleemosynary and
civil corporations, which enabled him to come under visitatorial
supervision. Generally, no such separation occurs, or rather, the
120
two functions are carried out by the same corporate entity.
The final grey area concerns natural justice. The cases most
pertinent to the subject, Vanek, Herring and King have already been
discussed. It has already been observed that there is no English
authority on the point of the courts' jurisdiction in areas of
visitatorial cognizance where a breach of natural justice has been
alleged. Vanek suggests that in such a case the visitor still has
exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand it has by no means been
settled that tenure proceedings are legally subject to the rules in any
case. However a number of the student cases have indicated that the
adjudicative bodies involved were judicial in nature.' 2 ' One major
problem is that it is by now apparently settled that a decision made
in breach of natural justice is in reality no decision at all, and
therefore that nothing the visitor does can make it one. Connected
with this is the notion that jurisdictional error should always be
reviewable in the courts.
King 12 2 perhaps encapsulates the problem, which clearly
involves the more general question of excluding the courts from
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at703
(1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 625 at 634
See, e.g. Vanek, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 429 at 437, per Clement J.A.
Seee.g. Glynn v.Keele University, [1971]2 All E.R. 89 (Ch.).
Supra, note 53
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internal university matters as well as the particular issue of natural
justice, more neatly than the other two cases. That case involved an
application by a student for mandamus to compel the university to
hear properly the appeal of the applicant against the decision of the
College of Law not to grant him the degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Johnson J., at first instance, held that the question of the granting of
degrees was a purely domestic one falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Visitor. The Court of Appeal also denied King his
remedy, but on the grounds that although the University Council
was a statutory body (established, or rather, continued by s.73 of
the University Act 1965)123 which had public duties, namely, "to
deal with and subject to an appeal to the Senate, to decide upon all
applications and memorials by students or others in connection with
any faculty in the University", which, prima facie, were
enforceable by mandamus, those public duties had, in the instant
case, been satisfactorily performed. With this conclusion the
Supreme Court of Canada agreed, adding that the procedures of the
various bodies to whom King had applied did not amount to a
breach of natural justice; a finding, which effectively excused the
Court from ruling definitely that mandamus was in fact an
appropriate remedy in the circumstances.
The public-private dichotomy that this illustrates has been
commented upon above. Spence J. revealed the Supreme Court's
doubts, pointing out that the issue was essentially a domestic one:
The considerations which are given to such an issue are not
those which can be assisted by an adversary formula, and it is
difficult to conceive of a situation which would have the
representatives of a law school faculty confronting the
representatives of a student in the trial of an issue as to whether a
degree should be granted. 124
The procedural problem, that is to say, the question whether natural
justice should apply, and if so in what form, to a statutory body
which decides inherently domestic issues (but which takes
extraneous matters into account) is different from the question
whether the prerogative orders should lie for breach of natural
justice in those circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the
second question did not need to be answered. As to the first the
statutory duty involved an application of the rules of natural justice.
123. UniversityAct, R.S.S. 1965, c. 181.
124. [1969] S.C.R. 678 at 686; 6 D.L.R. (3d) 120 at 128; 68 W.W.R. 745 at753
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The result of this would appear to be, as Megarry J. noted,
that every student in Canada who is disappointed at his degree
may, by the simple process of complaining of his disappointment, obtain one or more hearings according to the full process of
natural justice. 1.5
Magerry J.'s remarks are not perhaps quite fair. It may be that the
procedures involved in the consideration of whether or not to grant a
degree at Saskatchewan left something to be desired and that the
revelation of such shortcomings in the courts, or the threat of such
revelation might be considerably beneficial. However one cannot
help feeling that these matters are best dealt with internally and that
the adversarial factor, invariably implicit in the rules of natural
justice, has no place here.
So, policy, as well as law, is again involved here. If the visitor is
to be regarded as a useful, indeed vital, aspect of the university
heirarchy, that attitude will be based, to a considerable extent, on
the assumption that it is his function to administer a system of
essentially private justice. 126 To suggest that arbitrary and despotic
power is a necessary concomitant of this is ridiculous. If it is
asserted that "university law" is something apart from the common
law, and that the university's independence-in this sphere is a "good
thing" the argument against allowing natural justice cases is a
strong one. On the other hand these factors have to be weighed
against the subject's interest in having his procedural rights
protected in the courts.
D. The Scope ofJudicialReview
Given that the visitor has jurisdiction over domestic matters (with
the provisos noted above) the question arises as to the degree of
supervision over the visitor himself. The reports resound with
references to the "exclusive" and "arbitrary" nature of his
powers. 127 The possibility of interference by the court is described
as "meddlesome". InDr. Patrick'scase it was said:
125. Leary v. NationalUnion of Vehicle Builders [1971] Ch. 34, at 52
126. SeeR. v. Grundon, supra note 111 at 322, 1109 where it is said that the law
administered by the visitor is comparable to admiralty law. Certiorari,for instance
does not lie to a visitor (Bridge, op.cit. at 544). Prohibition does lie: see R. v. Dr.
Shippen, supra note 17.
127. For cases where the existence of a visitor has been held to exclude the courts,
see, as well as those mentioned already, R. v. Warden of all Souls College, in
Oxford (1682), Jo. T. 174; 84 E.R. 1203 (K.B.); R. v. Alsop (1682) 2 Show K.B.
170; 80 E.R. 868 (K.B.)
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here being a visitor appointed, the court had nothing to do in
the matter, for the founder intended that the college should be
free of all foreign suits, and that all controversies should be
determined within the university, to the intent that they might
better follow their studies, but by this means, if they should come
hither upon every controversy, the order and rule of the
universities should be overthrown, and the visitors28are the proper
judges of the laws and statutes and not this court. 1
The fact that there is no appeal on the merits from a visitor's
decision does not mean that the courts have no power to supervise
his acts. A body of case-law has been built up placing the visitor in
basically the same position as much more modem tribunals.
Reference has already been made tb "jurisdictional fact" in
connection with the visitor: The courts have had occasion to
determine whether a matter, such as trust, falls within or without
visitatorial cognizance.' 2 9 There is a number of other areas where
the court exerts control, and these help to clarify the exact
procedures to be followed by the visitor, in themselves an area of
doubt, given the antiquity of the office and the rarity of its exercise.
(It might be mentioned at this point that one of the most significant
aspects of the inherently private nature of visitatorial jurisdiction is
that a court has no notice of it unless it is brought to the court's
attention: "It is but a forum domesticum, and not taken notice of by
the common law."' 130 The common law has nonetheless imposed
some of its procedural standards.)
The visitor can be compelled to act by a writ of mandamus. Lord
Hardwicke, speaking in 1735, said that he did not know of any such
case,' 3 1 but the point appeared to be well settled by 1794. In R. v.
Bishop of Ely' 32 a fellow deprived of his office due to the
publication of a seditious pamphlet, appealed to the visitor who
dismissed the case. The plea for mandamus was rejected, but the
court made it clear that in an appropriate case they would compel
128. Dr. Patrick'sCase (1662) 1 Lev. 65, 83 E.R. 299 (K.B.) at 66, 300
129. An action may lie against a visitor who exceeds his jurisdiction: "where a
founder of an eleemosynary foundation appoints a visitor, and limits his
jurisdiction by rules and statutes, if the visitor in any sentence exceeds those rules,
an action lies against him, but it is otherwise where he mistakes in a thing within his
power, though in this case there be not any appeal over": Lord Holt in Philips v.
Bury, supra, note 9.
130. Dr. Walker's Case (1735), Cas. t. Hard. 212; 95 E.R. 137 (K.B.),
memorable as marking "positively the last appearance" of Dr. Bentley
131. Id. ats. 218, 140
132. R. v.Bishop of Ely (1794), 5T.R. 474; 101 E.R. 367 (K.B.)
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the visitor to act, although they were in no way concerned with the
merits of the case, Lord Kenyon saying:
It was settled in Phillips v. Bury that the court has no other
power than that of putting the visitatorial power in motion...
but that if the judgment of the
3 3 visitor be ever so erroneous, we
cannot interfere to correct it.Again, in R v. Bishop of Lincoln, 1 34 the visitor of Lincoln College,
Oxford was compelled, in accordance with the statutes, to hear an
appeal arising from the election of the rector: there it was said that
not only will the court not go into the merits of the case, but also
that they will not invariably compel the visitor to do so "for it is
sufficient, if he decides that the appeal comes too late." 13 5
The court can exercise no review of the visitor's actual findings
but it can supervise the manner in which he reaches them. If
visitatorial power is to be seriously regarded as a useful adjudicatory
tool it is important that the procedure to be followed should be
reasonably well defined. Fridman has asked a number of questions
136
about the way in which visitors might be expected to act.
One question that Fridman asks is: "Must the visitor personally
investigate and come to a decision? What assistance can he demand
to perform his task?" In the eighteenth century cases it seems quite
clear that visitors such as Bishops did conduct their own hearings
and come to their own conclusion, as the Bishops of Ely and
Lincoln did in the above cases. Lord Chancellors too seem to have
been conscientious; such notables as Lords Eldon 3 7 and
Brougham' 3 8 appearing in the law reports in visitatorial guise. In a
case in 1682 involving All Souls Oxford it seems taken for granted
that the visitor, the Archbishop of Canterbury, would hear and
determine the question himself. 13 9 By 1864, however, archepiscopal duties had presumably become more time-consuming. Then
the visitor was assisted by two assessors (one of them the future
Lord Coleridge) who prepared a report and recommendations which
the Archbishop simply confirmed. 140 So a degree of delegation
133. Id. at 477, 268.
134. R. v. Bishop of Lincoln (1785) 2 T.R. 338n., 100 E.R. 157 (K.B.); See also
Usher's Case (1960), 5 Mod. 452; 87 E.R. 759 (K.B.); and Ex parte Madfadyen,
supra note 40, especially at 204
135. Id. This seems, to say the least, a trifle unjust.
136. Supra, note 109 at21
137. In Queen's College, Cambridge (1821), Jacob 1; 37 E.R. 750
138. In ex parte Inge, re CatherineHall (1831), 2 Russ. & M.; 39 E.R. 519
139. Supra, note 127
140. Watson and Fremantle v. Warden and Fellows of All Soul's Oxford (1864),
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seems permissible. Some latitude is clearly allowed when the Queen
in Council is appointed visitor, as at London. In a case mentioned in
the Science Journal14 1 the committee appointed to act as visitor to
hear the appeal of a graduate student whose thesis had not been
accepted consisted of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, the then
Minister of Education, and the head of a Cambridge College.
Fridman proceeds to ask: "What criteria must [the visitor]
observe?" The answer to this has already been given. The visitor in
his role as the justiciary of a private jurisdiction, is to administer and
act according to, the statutes of his college or university, and where
they are silent on the point in question according to "the general
usage of the universities of England". College and university law
being similar to, though distinct from, the common law, and
visitatorial opinions apparently being given in writing, it would
seem that there is room for some system of precedent: at the same
time flexibility is desirable in an area in which there is, in any case,
little modem authority. Bridge points out that a "a visitor is not
required to proceed according to the rules of the common law":142
however the procedural guidelines settled by administrative law
have been imposed on him.
Therefore Fridman's next question, "Does he have to obey the
call of natural justice?" can be answered affirmatively. Both
branches of the rule apply. On the basis of R. v. Bishop of Lincoln it
was argued in R. v. Bishop of Ely14 3 (1788) (in which the fellows of
Peterhouse, Cambridge, sought a mandamus to compel the Bishop,
as visitor, to appoint one of their nominees as master) that "it is not
necessary for a visitor in any case to summon and hear the parties in
order to his giving judgment upon it. "144 The court, Ashurst, Buller
and Grace JJ. decided that this was not in fact, a case concerning the
Bishop's visitatorial authority. But rather concerning a distinct
power to appoont a master when the fellows were divided on the
subject, and the mandamus was issued. However, both Ashurst and
11 L.T. 166. The report in Philipsv. Bury notes that the visitor of Exeter College,

Oxford could visit either by himself or by commissary. This specific statutory
provision perhaps precludes the possibility of an inherent right to delegate
visitatorial functions. The case largely turned on the question whether the limitation
attached to the commission's power to depreive the rector applied also to the
Bishop himself.
141. (1970) 7th April, p. 7
142. Bridge, supra, note 1 at 545

143. R. v. Bishop ofEly (1788) 2 T.R. 290; 100 E.R. 167 (K.B.)
144. Id. at 322, 174
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Buller JJ. had no doubt that the visitor acting as such, had to fulfil
certain minimal procedural requirements. Ashurst J. said.
But even supposing that this matter was within the Bishop's
visitatorial authority, yet he has not acted in the character of a
vistor. The exercise of a visitor's power, in a case like the
present, is a judicial act; and 145
a Judge cannot determine without
hearing the parties concerned.
He should at least have convened the interested parties. The same
two judges were members of the court in a second case involving
the Bishop of Ely 146 who, this time in his capacity as visitor of Jesus
College, Cambridge, had dismissed the appeal of a Fellow removed
for writing a seditious pamphlet. A mandamus was sought
compelling him to rehear the appeal. The court refused to interfere.
The visitor had received the arguments of the parties: he had
decided the case on its merits. To interfere and control the judgment
of the visitor would be "attendant with the most mischievous
consequences",147 as the court was ignorant of the college's
statutes whose interpretation had been assigned to another forum.
Buller J. said that the right to be heard did not necessarily imply a
right to be heard personally. 148 Grose J. maintained the view that
the Court had "no authority to say how he should have
decided",149 but it seems clear that the audi alteram partem rule
applies.
The nemo judex in sua causa rule also applies. In 1727, inR. v.
Bishop of Chester 50 , mandamus was issued to the Bishop, as
warden of Manchester College, to admit a chaplain. The Bishop had
returned that he was visitor of the college, and that the jurisdiction
of the courts was consequently excluded. This argument was
rejected on the ground that the visitor "cannot visit himself'. This
was followed by a statute of 1728151 which provided that where the
Wardenship of Manchester College and the see of Chester were
vested in the same person, visitatorial jurisdiction over the college
should be vested in the Crown. Buller J. in the first Ely case said:
145. Id. at 322, 174
146. 5T.R. 474; 101 E.R. 267
147. Id.at476, 268
148. Id. at 477, 269
149. Id.
150. R. v. Bishop of Chester (1727), 2 Str. 797; 93 E.R. 855. See also Marsh v.
Huson College (1880) 27 G.C.R. 605 at 629
.-j-51. 2,Geo. 2, c.29
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• . . as this was not a visitatorial act it is impossible that the

propriety of the bishop's conduct can be inquired into by him as
visitor, for this would be to determine upon his own right ....
A visitor cannot be a judge
in his own cause-unless that power be
152
expressly given to him.

In Exparte Jacob153 the divinity professor at the University of New
Brunswick sought to have his dismissal quashed on the grounds of
breach of natural justice. The court held, inter alia, that the acts of a
visitor were judicial, and that the Lieutenant-Governor, as visitor,
was not precluded from passing judgment on acts to which he had
already given his approval as Governor-in-Council. It would seem
that this case falls into Buller J.'s category of express provision, for
according to Carter C.J.:
the union of the two characters in the Lieutenant-Governor,
which are said to be inconsistent, is affected
by the Foundation
54
itself, and is not unforeseen or accidental. 1
Nonetheless this would seem to be an appropriate case for the visitor
to use his authority to delegate to one with no preconceived ideas, if
such authority does in fact exist. Reference has already been made
to at least two instances where delegation on at least assistance has
taken place: one involving the Saskatchewan Court of King's
Bench 15 5 , and the other the Archbishop of Canterbury 56 . At least
in the former, delegation was expressly authorised, but in the light
of Buller J.'s emphatic statement in R. v. Bishop of Ely 1 57 that the

visitor must hear the parties concerned, it is doubtful whether there
is an inherent power to delegate. Clement J.A. in Vanek' 58 clearly
doubted whether there was. The special position existing when the
Sovereign is visitor and the powers are exercised by the Lord
Chancellor has already been dealt with.
E. Justification
Does the visitor matter? The question has to be asked. Recent cases
upholding his jurisdiction have been greeted with wailing and the
gnashing of teeth and slow emergence of this antediluvian
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Supra, note 143 at338
(1861) 1ON.B.R. 153
Id. at 157
Supra, note 27
Supra, note 140
Supra, note 145
[197515 W.W.R. 429 at 443
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functionary into the twentieth century cannot be expected to be
greeted without misgivings. There are, however, strong arguments
for its retention, and indeed encouragement.
When visitatorial prestige was at its peak, in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it was the only authority of its kind in the land.
It was in some respects a fore-runner of the modem administrative
body, having exclusive cognizance over a limited sphere of
acitivity. 15 9 Indeed the words of eighteenth century judges
justifying their refusal to "meddle" in university affairs are
remarkably similar to those of modem administrative lawyers
proclaiming the merits of such bodies as labour relation boards,
such as expertise, initiative, and expense:
And it is a more convenient method of determination of
controversies of this nature: it is at home, forum domestic, and
final in the first instance, and they should be judged in a short
way secundum arbitriumboni viri; it is true this power may be
abused, but if it is exercised in a direct
manner it is much less
0
expense that suits at law, or in equity. 16
If the court's reluctance to meddle, rather than any notable expertise
on the visitor's part has been a motive force in the development of
university law, there is no reason why a suitably qualified person
could not be found to fill the role.
That practical aspect is clearly an important consideration.
Bishops, alas, will probably no longer be acceptable. 161 McConnell
has observed that the functions involved call not for a lawyer as
much as someone with an "awareness of the ethos of the
institution",162 In view of what has gone before, however, a legal
training would be valuable. McConnell's suggestion that the visitor
should be elected by the members of a University for a period of,
say, five years (with jurisdiction presumably extended to those
entitled to vote) has its merits as a practical mode of appointment.
On the other hand, it clearly runs counter to the history of the
institution. The whole point of the visitor used to be that he was the
representative of the founder, whose duty was basically to
159. See Mullan, "The Modem Law of Tenure" in The University and the Law,
ed. Janisch (Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1975), 102, at 103
(hereinafter Janisch.)
160. Att.-Gen. v. Talbot, supra, note 31 at 674; 187
161. For a light-hearted look at episcopelean involvement in these matters see
Janisch, supra, note 159 at 94-100
162. McConnell, "The Errant Professoriate: An Inquiry into Academic Due
Process", (1973), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 250, at 278
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administer the founder's property according to his laws. To define
the visitor as, essentially, the representative of the corporators is a
considerable conceptual leap, destroying the distinction between
governor and governed emphasised in Wilson. Perhaps "consultation" would suffice.
The workload is unlikely to be overwhelming though there are
signs of increasing activity in the strictly academic field. The
assumption of a visitatorial authority by the court, as in
Saskatchewan, has its merits, but it negates many of the advantages
of the system, particularly where time and money are concerned.
The strongest objection that can be made by visitatorial
jurisdiction is that it takes away the right of a person to have the
termination of his status in an institution discussed in the courts.
However these are problems which the courts seem to be, for one
reason or another, reluctant to discuss. When there is a visitor they
have the perfect excuse not to intervene. Even when the question of
visitatorial jurisdiction is not raised, the courts have often either
denied that the plaintiff has the right to succeed, 163 or have in the
exercise of their discretion in the particular circumstances of the
64
case, chosen to deny that right to the applicant. 1
Consequently the curious situation exists that the people most
likely to protest at the "exclusive" nature of visitatorial
jurisdiction, namely students and teachers, are the people most
likely to benefit from it. This is especially true of teachers. The
legal position regarding tenure is dubious, even today. In Craig v.
University of Toronto165 an attempt was made to give legal status to
the "conception of tenure held by the academic community, and
operating as a custom or usage".' 6 6 That "conception" is the sort
of consideration to which a visitor would probably pay acknowledgement. It is his duty to regard not only the statutes, but also the
customs and standards of his institution, "the jus commune, as it
were, of societies." 167
Finally, the visitor would be a guarantee of autonomy. The
university is threatened by the state on many fronts, especially
163. As, e.g. in Orr v. University of Tasmania (1957), 100 C.L.R. 526 (H.C. of

A.)
164. As, e.g. in Glynn, [1971]2 All E.R. 89
165. Craigv. Governorsof University ofToronto (1923), 53 O.L.R. 312 (W.C.)

166. Laskin, "Some Cases at Law" in A Place of Liberty, ed. Whalley (Toronto:
Clarke, Irwin Co., 1964), 177 at 185
167. Lamprey, supra, note 72 at 215, 902
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financially. The existence of an automatic right of appeal from a
university tribunal to the courts could give the tribunal, if not the
university, the appearance of an administrative agency. A
comparison with trade unions and clubs fails to take account of the
unique position of the university. Of course this argument is not so
potent if a declaration is all that is being sought from the courts; and
if one is to retain access to the courts for jurisdictional error,
including failure of natural justice, the number of cases reaching the
courts may not be greatly reduced. Nonetheless appeal to the visitor
could be a valuable mode of redress of internal grievances. 168
168. For recent judicial notice of the advantages of visitatorial jurisdiction see the
still unreported decision of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Martineauand
Butters v. Matsqui Institution (decision handed down February 5th 1976) where
Jackett C.J. said "If there is to be a review [of disciplinary proceedings in a penal
institution] of a sufficiently speedy character that would not insert unwieldy and
unworkable characteristics into disciplinary proceedings ... such review cannot
be by the procedures of an ordinary court but must be by specially designed
procedures and by special Tribunals of a kind sometimes referred to as "visitors".
See also Select Committee on Student Relations, supra, Chapter 1, note 73, at
para. 208.

